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But here is the rub: Although one might simplistically 
leap to the conclusion (as the Department of Fish and 
Wildlife (DFW) and the appellate court in this case did) 
that any project that achieves a reduction greater than 29 
percent from a business-as-usual scenario is not 
significant (Newhall projected a 31 percent reduction 
from its assumed business-as-usual calculation), it turns 
out this determination is more complicated. 
First, what is the business-as-usual scenario for the 
population that would end up living in Newhall? That 
turns out to be a somewhat murky question. While the 
minority was ready to hold up their hands and say, “That 
is one for the experts,” the majority said that, as with all 
CEQA findings, this must be explained with reasoned 
analysis that is based on facts. The court here found that 
DFW failed to do so and suggested that, in fact, by 
making unsupported assumptions about the impacts of the 
density of the project versus the density of living sites for 
the business-as-usual population used by ARB, the 
agency may have skewed the result. 
Even more importantly, the court recognized that 
ARB’s business-as-usual scenario and its 29 percent 
reduction were an across-the-board average. That is, for 
example, there may be some projects in the future that can 
be expected to reduce their emissions by only 15 percent 
while others can be reasonably expected to reduce by 45 
percent. The fact that this project was reducing its 
emissions by 31 percent may or may not undermine the 
business-as-usual projections, depending on ARB’s 
assumptions and projections. The court argued that 
applying ARB’s projected reduction to an individual 
project requires a project-specific analysis of how the 
project fits into the statewide analysis. 
The court identified at least three ways that ARB might 
correct its analysis: 
• Evaluate the assumptions behind ARB’s business-as-
usual analysis and link those to the individual project. 
This approach may or may not be as simple as it 
sounds and would clearly require expert analysis. 
• Demonstrate the project is using mitigation measures 
consistent with requirements under AB 32. The court 
noted that these requirements may be limited to 
specific impacts. It would be better if local or 
regional agencies developed greenhouse gas plans 
consistent with AB 32 that would incorporate the 
project. If these agencies have not created sufficiently 
detailed and comprehensive plans, this route may be 
limited. 
• To the extent regional agencies have developed 
numerical thresholds for individual project 
greenhouse gas emissions (the example used by the 
court is BAAQMD’s thresholds), abide by those 
numbers. If the project exceeds those thresholds, or 
no thresholds have been adopted, then the project 
may adopt all feasible mitigation measures and, if 
impacts are still significant, issue a statement of 
overriding considerations. Considering that Newhall’s 
project already has a statement of overriding 
considerations for other impacts, this may be the 
simplest and most defensible approach, especially 
given Newhall’s representation it has designed a 
green project with the latest and best mitigations. 
Conclusion 
The larger implications of this decision are quite 
profound. A simple analysis based on the ARB 29 percent 
reduction calculation will not be sufficient. Further, the 
court opined that this figure may soon be outdated; far 
greater reductions will be required for large greenhouse 
gas emitters. Indeed, the state has new goals for 2030; the 
original Schwarzenegger climate change Executive Order 
(S-03–05, June 2005) called for more drastic reductions 
by 2050. 
Perhaps most importantly, the California Supreme 
Court’s majority has shown it is not afraid to engage in 
the more technical aspects of greenhouse gas-emission 
regulatory programs and baseline and business-as-usual 
calculations. While it can be expected that the court will 
show due deference to agencies such as ARB, 
fundamental gaps or gaming in the use of baselines or 
projections that could undermine environmental 
protections will not automatically be ignored. 





In Buchanan v Soto (2015) 241 CA4th 1353 (reported 
at p 17), two weeks after Diana Buchanan filed suit to 
collect money that Maria Soto owed her, Maria 
transferred her interest in her Olive Avenue properties to 
one of her co-owners, Ramon Soto, thereby ostensibly 
putting it beyond the reach of Buchanan’s subsequent 
efforts to collect on the money judgment that she was later 
to obtain. Ramon Soto was not only Maria’s husband, but 
had also been deported to Mexico (and appears to have 
been hiding), making it difficult for Buchanan to serve 
him in her action to set aside Maria’s conveyance. The 
case mainly involves jurisdictional questions, which I 
have asked my colleague, Marc Greenberg, to comment 
on, but I have also used the decision as a vehicle for 
allowing me to update readers on some new developments 
in fraudulent conveyance law. (As a mortgage lawyer, I 
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also wondered just how Buchanan was able to get a 
money judgment on a secured obligation without 
foreclosing first on the other security that she held. But 
since Maria chose to default rather than raise a one-
action defense in that lawsuit, I can’t let that worry 
me.)—RB 
Fraudulent Conveyance or Voidable 
Transaction? 
The most interesting questions in Buchanan v Soto are 
the jurisdictional ones, discussed in the second part of this 
column written by my colleague, Marc Greenberg. But 
also, apart from those matters, the decision provides me 
with a useful platform to enable attorneys for creditors to 
update their vocabulary and knowledge when attempting 
to set aside “fraudulent conveyances” structured by their 
clients’ debtors who are trying to avoid having to pay 
their bills. 
If Buchanan, the judgment creditor, were filing suit 
today (i.e., any time after January 1, 2016), rather than in 
2011, she would not style her action as one to set aside a 
fraudulent conveyance, as the court in Buchanan called it. 
Indeed, that particular label technically went out of date in 
1984, when California adopted the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act to replace its old (1918) Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, to ensure that transfers of personal 
property as well as conveyances of real property came 
under it. (After all, a debtor’s efforts to put her yacht 
beyond her creditor’s reach can be as economically 
significant as doing so with her building.) Now, as of 
2016, the wrongful act is to be called a “voidable 
transaction” by virtue of statutory amendments made in 
2015, following the protocols of the new Uniform 
Voidable Transaction Act (UVTA), already adopted in a 
number of other states. See CC §3439. 
“Voidable,” as a modifier, is clearly preferable to 
“fraudulent,” since no version of the statute ever really 
required fraud—”constructive fraud” or “badges of fraud” 
being quite adequate—and the inclusion of “fraudulent” 
only confused everyone—especially law students, young 
lawyers, and sometimes judges who thought they needed 
to apply heightened standards of pleading or proof 
because “fraud” was being alleged. See, e.g., Reddy v 
Gonzalez (1992) 8 CA4th 118, 123, reported at 15 CEB 
RPLR 324 (Oct. 1992). See also Comment 8 to UVTA 
§4: 
The phrase “hinder, delay, or defraud” in §4(a)(1) ... is 
potentially applicable to any transaction that unacceptably 
contravenes norms of creditors’ rights. Section 4(a)(1) is 
sometimes said to require “actual fraud,” by contrast to §4(a)(2) 
and §5(a), which are said to require “constructive fraud.” That 
shorthand is highly misleading. Fraud is not a necessary element 
of a claim for relief under any of those provisions. By its terms, 
§4(a)(1) applies to a transaction that “hinders” or “delays” a 
creditor, even if it does not “defraud” the creditor. 
On the other hand, “voidable” emphasizes the relief the 
creditor seeks, rather than the quality of the acts 
committed by the debtor. Calling it a “transaction” rather 
than a “transfer” or “conveyance” clarifies that there are 
other bad ways of hiding an asset besides purportedly 
transferring it (such as encumbering it with a phony lien). 
So, today we would say that Maria—the judgment debtor 
in Buchanan—engaged in a voidable transaction by 
conveying her fractional interest in the Olive Avenue 
properties so as to put it beyond the reach of Buchanan. 
Technically, all the statutory changes I am about to 
mention only apply to causes of action, transfers, and 
obligations that arise after 2015, but for convenience here 
I will assume that the rest of this story comes under the 
new version of the Act. 
To prove her case, Buchanan would have to show that 
Maria either 
• Transferred her interest to Ramon with an intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud Buchanan (“actual fraud,” as 
it used to be called); or 
• Did not receive reasonably equivalent value for it and 
was insolvent (the old constructive fraud). 
CC §§3934.04, 3934.05. Those standards are unchanged 
(although the old special definition of partnership 
insolvency in CC §3934.02(b) has been eliminated), but 
some new procedural refinements are added: Now, 
Buchanan has the statutory burden of proving most of the 
elements (of constructive fraud), but with the qualification 
that a preponderance of the evidence will satisfy that 
burden. CC §3439.05(b). Some of the particulars of the 
defenses of good faith and reasonably equivalent value 
are allocated to Maria and others to Buchanan, again with 
a preponderance of evidence standard. CC §3439.08(f). 
In general, the controlling law for fraudulent 
conveyances is now the law of the jurisdiction in which 
Maria was located when the transaction occurred—not 
where the asset was (the old “situs rule” of the First 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws) or the jurisdiction 
having the primary interest in the litigation (the “interest 
analysis” of the Second Restatement). This should make it 
harder for a crooked debtor to transfer an asset in state A 
and thereafter move to state B, where its laws are more 
forgiving, but would also make it harder for a California 
court to undo even a California transaction when the 
debtor was clever enough to have located itself in a 
friendly jurisdiction at the start (such as Delaware, where 
“series organizations” are able to shelter some of their 
assets from their other liabilities). CC §3934.10(b). 
Finally, if Buchanan had to show that Maria was 
insolvent at the time of the transaction—having 
transferred her house without receiving reasonably 
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equivalent value—the existing presumption of insolvency 
on which she might rely (“not paying debts as they 
become due”) is now qualified by a new exception for 
“other than as a result of a bona fide dispute,” although 
rebutting this presumption requires only a showing that 
“nonexistence of insolvency is more probable than its 
existence.” CC §3439.02b. 
There are other changes in the new Act not worth 
mentioning here, but which we all have to get used to. 
Long-Arm Jurisdiction 
The opinion authored by Judge Patricia Benke in 
Buchanan v Soto reaffirms two long-standing principles in 
the law of civil procedure: 
• The doctrine of in rem jurisdiction applies to give the 
court specific jurisdiction under long-arm statutes 
over defendants who are out of state but whose 
property is within the state, when that property is at 
issue in the case; and 
• Defendants who seek the equitable remedy of 
dismissal of a case, on the ground that service by 
publication was not valid service on them, cannot 
come into court with “unclean hands” and still expect 
that relief. 
In Rem Jurisdiction 
According to the court’s decision, on July 29, 2011, 
Maria Soto transferred her interest in the Olive Avenue 
properties to her husband, Ramon. As soon as he became 
a property owner in San Diego County, under the doctrine 
of in rem jurisdiction, Ramon had consented to the 
jurisdiction of the state and federal courts in that county 
with respect to any litigation involving his right to, title 
to, or ownership of that property. 
The history and rationale behind this policy is the 
subject of study by every first-year law student in the 
course on Civil Procedure. The case of International Shoe 
v Washington (1945) 326 US 310, 316, 66 S Ct 154, 
established that personal jurisdiction could be asserted 
over a person who was not present in the forum state 
when that person had, by virtue of their contacts within 
the forum, purposely availed themselves of the protection 
and benefits of the laws of that jurisdiction. The policy 
rationale was that, having received the benefits of doing 
business or engaging in other activities within the forum 
state, a defendant should be amenable to suit within that 
state as well, as long as the assertion of that jurisdiction 
was reasonable and didn’t offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice. 
Following the decision in International Shoe, states 
adopted “long-arm” statutes designed to allow state courts 
to assert in personam jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants, which comported with due process 
requirements. When a nonresident defendant had 
systematic and continuous contacts within the forum, it 
was deemed that the courts of that forum had general 
jurisdiction over that defendant—which meant that a suit 
or suits for any and all claims against that defendant could 
be brought in that forum’s courts. When the contact with 
the forum was less frequent or less extensive, the 
assertion of jurisdiction required meeting the test for 
specific jurisdiction. To meet this test, a plaintiff would 
have to show that a nonresident defendant has sufficient 
“minimum contacts” within the jurisdiction, and that 
those contacts gave rise to the claim asserted by the 
plaintiff, such that the due process principles of giving 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, in the context of 
fair play and substantial justice, were met. Very few out-
of-state defendants have sufficient contacts to warrant 
general jurisdiction over them, so most cases, such as this 
one, use the specific jurisdiction test. 
When the plaintiff’s claim(s) have to do with the 
defendant’s right to, title to, or ownership of real property, 
the in rem doctrine applies to determine whether specific 
jurisdiction can be asserted. In the Buchanan decision, 
Judge Benke held that “As the then-owner of Maria’s 
interest in the Olive Properties, we independently 
conclude Ramon purposefully availed himself of the 
benefits and protections of the laws of California.” 241 
CA4th at 1363. She justified this holding by citing three 
cases establishing that holding a deed of trust represents a 
significant contact with the forum state. Buchanan v Soto, 
supra, citing Easter v American W. Fin. (9th Cir 2004) 
381 F3d 948, 960; Gognat v Ellsworth (WD Ky, Mar. 6, 
2009, No. 5:08-CV-100-TBR) 2009 US Dist Lexis 99456; 
and Johnson v Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001–4 
(D DC 2006) 451 F Supp 2d 16, 32. 
Moving to the “arising out of” forum-related activity 
requirement, Judge Benke found the circumstances that 
created Ramon’s ownership interest in the Olive 
Properties were at the heart of the case. “Quite simply, 
without the transfer of that interest by Maria, there would 
be no fraudulent conveyance action against Ramon.” 241 
CA4th at 1364. Based on that finding, she concluded that 
Ramon’s conduct within the forum state, in receiving this 
transfer, met the “arising out of “ requirement for specific 
jurisdiction. 
The last element of the test—that the assertion of 
jurisdiction be reasonable and not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice—is generally 
found to be met when the evidence shows purposeful 
availment and forum-related contacts from which the case 
arises. In my experience, it is very rare that a defendant 
whose conduct satisfies the first two elements is able to 
avoid jurisdiction by asserting that it would be 
unreasonable to have to defend the case in that forum. In 
our digital, easy-to-connect world, there is very little basis 
for asserting that defending a case in a distant forum is a 
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severe hardship. Judge Benke also asserted this view: 
“[W]here a defendant who purposefully has directed his 
activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, 
he must present a compelling case that the presence of 
some other considerations would render jurisdiction 
unreasonable.” 241 CA4th at 1365 (emphasis added). 
Having disposed of Ramon Soto’s objections about the 
assertion of jurisdiction over him, the court next 
addressed his claim that the service of process by 
publication was improper. 
The Service Issue: Buchanan’s Good 
Faith Effort Versus Ramon’s Bad Faith 
Evasion 
My title here foreshadows the outcome. Ramon Soto 
argued that service by publication wasn’t warranted here 
and that Buchanan failed to exercise due diligence in 
finding him and having him personally served, in 
violation of his due process rights. The proper analysis of 
this issue thus requires an assessment of Buchanan’s 
efforts to serve Ramon and whether Ramon’s conduct 
contributed to the failure to find and personally serve him. 
The court noted that the case record reflects that 
Buchanan first tried serving Ramon at his marital 
residence in San Marcos. Maria Soto disclosed at that 
time that Ramon no longer lived there—he had been 
deported due to criminal activities and was now living in 
Mexico, somewhere in the rural Mexicali area. Mexicali 
is the capital city of the Mexican state of Baja California, 
with a population of over one million people and a 
physical territory covering over 212 square miles. 
Without more specifics, Maria’s information about 
Ramon’s whereabouts was next to worthless. 
Left with no other information about Ramon’s location, 
Buchanan sought and was granted the right to serve him 
via publication. The trial court found, and the court of 
appeal affirmed, that her efforts were sufficiently diligent 
to warrant that method of service. This conclusion was 
amply supported by evidence that Ramon, with the active 
participation of Maria, was attempting to avoid service. 
He was in telephone communication with Maria during 
the relevant time periods. In his motion to vacate the 
judgment (via a special appearance), he filed a declaration 
listing an address in Mexico where he had not lived for 
several months. Based on this conduct, the court found 
Buchanan’s efforts to be reasonable, in good faith, and 
diligent—and, by implication, found Ramon’s efforts to 
avoid service to be bad faith conduct. 
In sum, Ramon’s acquisition of an ownership interest 
in the property justified the assertion of specific 
jurisdiction over him via the doctrine of in rem 
jurisdiction. His efforts to evade service of process 
warranted the use of service by publication. 
